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I. INTRODUCTION
Environmental tobacco smoke ("ETS") is the "second-hand" smoke produced
by cigarettes. Recent evidence suggests that ETS presents a broad-reaching
public health risk. 4 For some individuals, however, ETS presents an especially
acute threat. These individuals, many of whom have pre-existing respiratory
or cardiac disabilities, find that significant exposure to ETS precludes them
from continuing to work or participate fully in public life.5

1Professor of Law, Northeastern University School of Law, Boston, Mass., J.D. 1982
Harvard Law School, A.B. 1979 Cornell University.
2

Attorney, Tobacco Control Resource Center, Boston, Mass., J.D. 1993, Northeastern
School of Law.
3

Professor of Law, Northeastern University, School of Law, Boston, Mass., J.D. 1967
Harvard Law School, Ph.D. 1980 Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
This work was supported by grant 024787 from the Robert Wood Johnson
Foundation, Princeton, New Jersey.
4
5

For a fuller discussion, see infra Part II.

Barbara Chilmonxzyk, Association Between Exposure to EnvironmentalTobacco Smoke
and ExacerbationsofAsthma in Children, 328 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1665-69 (1993); Stanton A.
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The danger of ETS could potentially be limited by federal legislation. In June
1997 negotiators representing state attorneys generals who had sued tobacco
companies, tobacco manufacturers and lawyers representing class action
plaintiffs signed a "Proposed Resolution" of their lawsuits which would require
federal legislation.6 Title IV of this proposal would, if implemented, restrict
smoking to ventilated areas of public buildings regularly entered by 10 or more
individuals at least one day per week. 7 The proposal, however, would create
an exemption for restaurants (other than fast food restaurants), bars, private
clubs, hotel guestrooms, casinos, bingo parlors, tobacco merchants, and
prisons. To date, the fate of this proposal is uncertain. 8 Moreover, even if some
form of the proposal is enacted, it may follow the settlement in not providing
any private right of action to enforce the restrictions on public smoking. 9
Similarly, the proposal fails to provide any protection for individuals harmed
by tobacco in the various buildings exempt from the restriction. As a result,
whether or not some form of the settlement ultimately becomes law,
individuals who are significantly harmed by ETS may still look to other federal
remedies. 10 Chief among them is the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA").ll
In recent years, several individuals have used the ADA to challenge smoking
policies of their employers or public accommodations. In effect, these
individuals have claimed that the refusal to prohibit or limit smoking
constitutes a refusal to provide a "reasonable accommodation" necessary to
permit them to fully participate in a public accommodation or place of
employment. Although these cases have sometimes failed due to their
particular facts, 12 several courts have agreed that ETS-related claims may be

Glantz, & William W. Parmley, Passive Smoke and Heart Disease: Mechanisms and Risk,
273 JAMA 1047 (1995).
6

Proposed Resolution, June 20, 1997 (On file with authors and available on the
Internet)<http:/ /stic.neu.edu/settlement/6-20-settle.htm)>. The settlement proposal
pending in the U.S. Senate has recently been rejected by the tobacco industry. However,
Congress continues to explore possible legislative responses.
7

1d. at 30.

8

David E.Rosenbaum, Tobacco Road: Path Toward Legislation Appears Unclear, N.Y.
TIMEs, Apr. 19, 1998, at A15.Several bills, with varying terms, have been introduced to
implement the proposal. See, e.g., S.1414, 105th Cong. 2d Sess. (1997); S. 1492, 105th
Cong. 2d Sess. (1997).
9
See Proposed Resolution at 30-31. In general the settlement provided for
enforcement by the federal government and state and local agencies. No provision was
made for individual enforcement. See id at 26.

10 The ETS provisions of the proposal would not have preempted the enforcement of
other federal laws. Id. at 31.
1142 U.S.C. § 12101-12213 (1997).
12 Cases that have not succeeded include: Emery v. Caravan of Dreams, 879 F. Supp.
640 (N.D. Tex.), affd sub nom, Emery v. Dreams Spirits, Inc., 85 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 1995)

1997-98]

ENVIRONMENTAL TOBACCO SMOKE

actionable under the Act.1 3 No court has disagreed. A recent jury verdict in
which a severely asthmatic prison guard, who claimed to have required more
than twenty emergency room treatments post-ETS exposure in the workplace,
was awarded $420,300 and reinstatement suggests that the ADA's promise in
14
this area may indeed be fulfilled.
Judicial acceptance of ETS-related ADA claims should not be surprising. A
relatively straightforward reading of the ADA, and its history and regulations,
makes clear that in certain instances the refusal to alter smoking policies, just
like the refusal to alter any other policy that prohibits individuals with
disabilities from working or fully participating in a public accommodation,
15
Nevertheless, the use of the ADA to challenge
may be discriminatory.
smoking policies raises important questions about the breadth and meaning of
the ADA. For some advocates of disability rights, the use of the ADA for such
cases may seem an unwarranted extension of the ADA. These advocates fear
that such a use may weaken the Act's potential to prohibit "real discrimination"
16
On the other side of the
against individuals with traditional disabilities.
debate, employers and managers of public accommodations may fear that the

(mem.); Harmer v. Virginia Elec. and Power Co., 831 F. Supp. 1300 (E.D. Va. 1993).
13 Homeyer v. Stanley Tulchin Assocs., 91 F.3d 959 (7th Cir. 1996); Muller v. Costello,
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5239 (N.D. N.Y. April 16, 1996); Staron v. McDonald's Corp., 51
F.3d 353 (2d Cir. 1995).
This article addresses persons who may suffer a disability by exposure to ETS as
distinct from any claim made by a person suffering from any tobacco caused disease or
disability resulting from the claimant's own smoking conduct.
14

Associated Press, Fired Prison Guard Awarded $420,3000, THE BUFFALO NEws, Oct.
19, 1997, at 12A.
15
See generally, Mark A. Gottlieb, et al., Second-Hand Smoke and the ADA: Ensuring
Access for Persons with Breathingand Heart Disorders, 13 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 635
(1994); Wendy E. Parmet, et al., The Physician'sRole in Helping Smoke-Sensitive Patientsto
Use the Americans with DisabilitiesAct to Secure Smoke-Free WorkPlaces and Public Spaces,
276 JAMA 909 (1996).
16
Sara D. Watson, for example, discussed how some members of the disability
community have insisted upon a separation of traditional disabilities from illnesses, the
result being that the disability movement "has ignored the many people whose
disabilities do have medical implications-such as those with heart disease, cancer, and
arthritis." Sara D. Watson, The Evolution ofa Social Movement, 3 CORNELL J.L & PUB. POL'Y,
254, 257 (1994). The desire to separate disability from illness stems from many reasons
including the desire to disprove the stereotypes of individuals with disabilities as ill and
dependent. Id. at 257. Another reason involves the rejection of the medical model of
disability through which medical practitioners exercised significant control (often in
quite harsh ways) over the lives of individuals with disabilities. See Jonathan Drimmer,
Cripples Overcomers and Civil Rights: Tracing the Evolution of FederalLegislation and Social
Policy for People with Disabilities,40 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1347-48 (1993). Undoubtedly,
some advocates for individuals with disabilities may also fear that the extension of the
concept of disability to nontraditional disabilities will engender just the type of backlash
described in text accompanying notes 17 and 134-36 infra. The problem, of course, is that
by denying the disability status of some disabilities, the very real needs of some
individuals with disabilities are being ignored. See Watson at 257.
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application of the ADA to ETS-related claims threatens to "open the floodgates"
17
to judicial review of many employment or business policies.
This Article explores the use of the ADA to challenge smoking policies and
the fears and questions that such a use raises. We argue that a careful
appreciation of the ADA's application to ETS-related claims should temper the
worries of both those who see such claims as trivializing the ADA and those
who worry that such claims may impose enormous burdens on American
businesses. Rather, we suggest that the ADA in this instance, as in others,
provides a limited but critical vehicle for ensuring that individuals with
disabilities may fully participate in public life. We suggest further that the
issues raised by the application of the ADA to ETS provides a useful vehicle for
reconsidering the meaning and impact of the ADA and dispelling some of the
myths that have surrounded its advent.
II. BACKGROUND ON ETS
The dangers of cigarette smoking have long been well established. The risks
that cigarette smoke, an environmental pollutant containing over 4,000
chemicals, 18 poses to nonsmokers, however, have only recently been well
documented. In 1986, then Surgeon General C. Everett Koop released a report
on passive smoking and health, which concluded, among other things, that
ETS causes lung cancer as well as a host of other respiratory problems in
nonsmokers. 19 The report further found that the simple separation of smokers
and nonsmokers within the same airspace does not eliminate the risks posed
20
by ETS.
The evidence establishing the dangers of ETS was more fully reviewed in
the 1993 US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) report on the respiratory
effects of ETS, Respiratory Effects of Passive Smoking: Lting Cancer and Other
Disorders.2 1 Summarizing the scientific literature through 1992, the report
concluded that involuntary smoking leads to the death of 3,000 non-smoking

17
Similar points have been made about other types of claims brought under the ADA.
See Fred Pelka, Attack of the Morally Challenged: Congress Goes After the Disabled, 5 ON
THE IssuEs 36 (1996).
18U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, RespiratoryHealth Effects of PassiveSmoking:
Lung Cancer and Other Disorders. Washington, D.C. at 3-1, 1992. USEPA document
EPA/600/6-90/006F.

19U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, The Health Consequences of
Involuntary Smoking: a Report of the Surgeon General. U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control, Center for Health
Promotion and Education, Office on Smoking and Health, Rockville, Md. 1986.
Publication No. DHHS(CDC)87-8398.
20

Id.

21U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, supra note 18. The tobacco industry
challenges the EPA's findings and has sought a retraction of the Report in Flue-Cured
Tobacco CooperativeStabilization Corp. v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 1995 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 7521 (M.D.N.C. May 23, 1995).
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Americans each year by lung cancer.22 Based on this finding, the EPA declared
ETS to be a Group A (or known human) carcinogen for which there is no safe
level of exposure. Other important conclusions were that:
ETS causes as many as 300,000 lower respiratory tract infections in
infants each year resulting in as many as 15,000 hospitalizations;
ETS causes fluid buildup in the middle ear, the most common cause
of hospitalization and surgery for American children; and
23
ETS exacerbates and may in fact help to cause new cases of asthma.
Although ETS poses a generalized health risk to all individuals exposed to
it, its impact may be especially severe for some individuals with particular
disabilities. For example, individuals prone to asthma may be highly
vulnerable to the effects of ETS.
Asthma is a disorder triggered by a number of events, including exposure
to allergens, sneezing, physical activity (running, etc.), or other causes which
create stress on the respiratory system to increase air.intake. 24 Once triggered,
asthma restricts air intake by inflaming the bronchial tubes, thus narrowing the
passages through which the air must travel. In some instances, attacks may be
triggered by exposure to cigarette smoke.25
Much of the research on asthma and ETS examines the effects on the four
million children in the U.S. with asthma.26 The 1992 EPA report reviewed ten
studies published after 1986 (when the Surgeon General's report found no
"consistent relationship" between ETS exposure and asthma).27 The EPA found
that the newer evidence revealed an association and suggested the possibility
of a causal link between ETS exposure and asthma in children. 28 A recently
published meta-analysis of studies examining ETS and asthma estimated that
somewhere between 307,000 and 522,000 cases of asthma among children
2
under 15 years old are attributable to ETS exposure. 9
Studies have also found a relationship between ETS and adult asthma. A
recent Swiss study found that non-smoking adults exposed to ETS at work or
home were at higher risk for physician-diagnosed asthma. The study also

22

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, supra note 18, at 1-1.

23

1d.

24

Asthma: Asthma Triggers, American Lung Association at 2, Chicago, Ill. (1996).

25

Chilmonxzyk, supra note 5, at 1665-69.

26

See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, supra note 18.

27

Id.

28

See, e.g., Joan Cunningham, et al., Environmental Tobacco Smoke, Wheezing, and
Asthma in Childrenin 24 Communities, 153(1) AM. J RESPIR. CRIT. CARE MED. 218-24 (1996);
Joseph R. DiFranza & Robert Lew, Morbidity and Mortality in ChildrenAssociated with the
Use of Tobacco Products by Other People, 97 PEDIATRICS 560 (1996).
29
DiFranza & Lew, supra note 28, at 560.
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suggested a dose-dependent increase in asthma symptoms related to hours of
30
ETS exposure.
In both adults and children ETS exposure can aggravate asthma in two ways.
First, long term exposure can trigger bronchial hyperreactivity, which means
that exposure to certain airborne substances results in decreased lung
performance. Second, a short exposure to ETS can result in an almost
immediate decrease in lung function of similar magnitude. 31 Either way,
exposure to ETS can result in a serious health risk and prevent an individual
from engaging in his or her normal life activities.
Individuals with other respiratory disabilities face similar ETS-related risks.
Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), covers a group of diseases
which have symptoms including chronic cough and expectoration, shortness
of breath, and progressive reduction in lung function. Two of the more common
diseases to fall under the COPD designation are emphysema and chronic
bronchitis. 32 COPD is often caused by active smoking. 33 For former smokers
with COPD, ETS can exacerbate the condition, decrease lung function and
make it difficult for such individuals to work. 34
Studies have examined the effect of ETS on pulmonary function in adults
and found that exposure results in a significant drop in lung function. 35 These
studies reported a drop in forced expiratory flow, forced expiratory volume,
and vital capacity. This means that ETS exposure can reduce one's ability to
inhale, exhale, and hold air in the lungs. ADA claims brought by persons with
COPD would likely focus on this decrease in pulmonary function as they
already suffer from permanently diminished lung capacity.
Less well known respiratory conditions can also make an individual
36
especially sensitive to ETS. Individuals with systemic lupus erythematosus

30Philippe Leuenberger, Passive Smoking Exposure in Adults and Chronic Respiratory
Symptoms, 150 AM. J RESPmR. CRIT. CARE MED. 1221-28 (1994).
31 Anne Knight & Anthony B.X. Breslin, Passive Cigarette Smoking and Patients With
Asthma, 142 MED. J. AUSTL. 194-95 (1995).
32
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease, 177-178 (Rev. Ed., 1992); Mosby Medical
Encyclopedia, Chronic Obstructive PulmonaryDisease, Penguin Books, USA (1992).
33
American Thoracic Society, Cigarette Smoking and Health 153 AM. J RESPIR. CRIT.
CARE MED. 861-65 (1996).
34

James R. White & Herman F. Froeb, Small Airways Dysfinction in Non-Smokers
ChronicallyExposed to Tobacco Smoke, 302 NEW ENG. J. MED. 720-23 (1980).
35

Maria A. Masi, et al., Environmental Exposure to Tobacco Smoke and Lung Function in
Young Adults, 138 AM. REv. RESPIR. DISEASES 296-99 (1988). See also, Mohammed-Reza
Masjedi, et al., Effects of Passive Smoking on the PulmonaryFunction of Adults, 45 THORAX
27-31 (1990).
36
See, e.g., Andrew P. Andonopoulos et. al. Pulmonary Function of Non-Smoking
Patientswith Systematic Lupus Erythematosus, 94 CHEsT 312 (1988); Michael M. Ward &
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and cystic fibrosis 37 suffer from diminished lung capacity, and thereby
particular vulnerability to ETS. Individuals with multiple chemical
39
sensitivity 38 and some persons with severe allergies, may also be vulnerable.
While the harm that ETS causes those with respiratory problems appears
most obvious, ETS is actually thought to affect far more people with heart
disease. Recent studies provide evidence to support the link between ETS
exposure and heart disease.40 A paper in the Journal of the American Medical
Association estimates the number of deaths from heart disease caused by ETS
41
exposure at roughly 30,000 to 60,000 people per year in the United States.
About three times that many people suffer non-fatal heart episodes due to ETS
exposure. 42 ETS exposure is also suspected to further limit the activities of some
43
angina sufferers.
Whether an individual has angina, some other form of coronary disease, or
a respiratory disability, the impact of ETS is severe. For these persons, ETS
presents not merely a hypothetical long-term risk, but a very concrete and
imminent health danger. For them, independence and full participation in the
workforce and the activities of public life require the reduction or removal of
ETS. To achieve this goal, some of these individuals have turned to the ADA.

Stephanie Studenski, Clinical Prognostic Factors in Lu pus Nephritis, 152 ARCHIVES
INTERNAL MED. 2082 (1992).
37
D.J. Shale, Cystic FibrosisIntroduction, 45 THORAX 880 (1990); Lucille Lester, et al.,
DELTA F508 Genotype Does Not Predict Disease Severity in an Ethnically Diverse Cystic

FibrosisPopulation, 93 PEDIATRICS 114-18 (1994).
38

Multiple chemical sensitivity (MCS) is a condition, the origin of which is not
entirely known, which is thought by some to be caused by a one-time or extended
exposure to sensitizing toxic chemical agents. Adverse symptoms are brought on by
subsequent exposure to various chemical substances at exposure levels so low that, for
most people, they are considered harmless. ETS, which contains thousands of toxic
chemicals, adversely affects most individuals suffering from MCS. L. Charrair, General
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity, US Department
of Housing and Urban Development: Technical Guidance Memurandum 91-3:
Multiple Sensitivity Disorder; June 6, 1991. The authors appreciate the advice and
comments regarding MCS provided by Susan Clarke (ENHALE, an MCS support
organization in Massachusetts) and Nicholas Ashford (Professor of Technology and
Policy, Mass. Inst. of Technology).
39

K.F. Keller & R.J. Doyle, A Mechanism for Tobacco Smoke-Induced Allergy, 57 J.

ALLERGY CLIN. IMMUNOL. 278 (1976).
40

Glantz & Parmley, supra note 5, at 1047-53.

41 Id.
42

Kyle Steenland, Passive Smoking and the Risk of HeartDisease,267 JAMA 94-99 (1992).

43

Jadranka Mustaibegovic & Eugenija Zuskin, Passive smoking -(Un)recognized

Effects on the RespiratorySystem, 115 LIECNICKI VJESNIK 179-84 (1993).
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III. INTRODUCTION TO THE ADA

The 1990 enactment of the ADA 44 was accompanied by much fanfare and
promise. Heralded by President Bush, as well as its proponents, as a declaration
of independence for individuals with disabilities, 45 the Act was the
culmination of a long struggle by people with disabilities for a far-reaching
antidiscrimination law. 46 Although an earlier federal law, Sec. 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, prohibited discrimination against individuals with
disabilities, it applied only to recipients of federal financial assistance. 47 The
ADA extended the prohibition to state and local governments, 4 8 and to much
of the private sector.
If the ADA had any single goal, it was inclusion. 49 The Act's preamble states
that "historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with
disabilities..."50 By prohibiting discrimination, it was hoped, individuals with
disabilities would be able to achieve "full participation, independent living,
and economic self-sufficiency..."51
In order to realize those goals, the ADA borrowed a purposefully
open-ended definition of disability from the Rehabilitation Act. 52 This
definition applies even to individuals who do not have traditional, or visible,
disabilities. 53 Indeed, the drafters of the bill opined that some 43 million
Americans would qualify as having a disability.54

44

Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1990)).

45Terry Wilson, Independence Dayfor People with Disabilities,CHI. TRIB., July 27, 1990,
at 1.
46

See Drimmer, supra note 16, at 1376-97.

4729 U.S.C. § 794 (1995).
4842 U.S.C. § 12132 (1996).
49

See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1990) ("The Purpose of the
Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) ... is to provide a clear and comprehensive
national mandate to end discrimination against individuals with disabilities and to
bring those individuals into the economic and social mainstream of American life.").
5042 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (1996).
5142 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (1996). For a discussion and critique of this utilitarian vision,
see Drimmer, supra note 16, at 1400-02.
52

See infra Part V.

53

Chai R. Felblum, Employment Protections,in THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILMEs ACT:
FROM POLICYTO PRACTICE at 81, 85 (Jane West ed. 1991).
5442 U.S.C. 12101 § (a)(1) (1996).
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The ADA is also broad in its scope. Title I of the Act applies to most
workplaces. 55 State and local governments are covered by Title 11.56 Title III
deals with public accommodations, 57 which are defined comprehensively to
include most services and facilities operating in interstate commerce. The Act
specifies that the term shall include inns, hotels, restaurants, motion picture
houses, sales or rental establishments, offices of accountants, lawyers, or health
care providers, museums, libraries, parks, places of education and many other
facilities which service the public. 58 Only the airline and the housing industries
appear not to be covered. Discrimination against individuals in those sectors
of the economy forms the subject of other laws. 59
The ADA also employs a complex and comprehensive definition of
"discrimination.' 60 The Act does not simply prohibit invidious treatment
against individuals with disabilities. It recognizes that often individuals with
disabilities are excluded from jobs and public accommodations not by
intentional acts of discrimination, but by the unthinking use of criteria and
61
standards that tend to disparately disadvantage those who have disabilities.
62
As a result, the Act prohibits some forms of disparate impact discrimination.
The employment provisions prohibit employers from "utilizing standards,
criteria, or methods of administration-(A) that have the effect of
discrimination on the basis of disability; or (B) that perpetuate the
63
discrimination of others who are subject to common administrative control.'

5542 U.S.C. § 12111 (1996). The Act does not apply to workplaces with less than 15
workers, the United States, Indian tribes, or bona fide private membership clubs exempt
from federal income taxation. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5) (1996).
5642 U.S.C. § 12131 (1996).
5742 U.S.C. § 12181 (1996).
5842 U.S.C. § 12181 (1996). The definition of "public accommodations," includes 12
distinct entity of categories. The statute provides examples of the types of entities that
would fall within each category and makes clear that its examples are illustrative only
and do not exhaust the list of possible entities within each category.
59Discrimination in housing is prohibited by the Fair Housing Amendments Act of
1988, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1996). Discrimination in air traffic is prohibited by the Air
Carriers Fair Access Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1301, note 1374 (1996). Much of the analysis in this
article may be applicable to these statutes.
60
See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (1996) and 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (1996). See also Wendy E.
Parmet, Discriminationand Disability: The Challenges of the ADA, 18 LAw MED. & HEALTH
CARE, 331, 332 (1990).
61
Sen. Rep. 101-485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 58059 (1990); Parmet, supra note 60, at 336.
See also Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985)(Rehabilitation Act case discussing the
nature of discrimination against individuals with disabilities).
62
See Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325 (3d Cir. 1995); David Orentlicher, Destructuring
Disability: Rationing of Health Care and UnfairDiscriminationAgainst the Sick, 31 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 49,57 (1996).
6342 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3) (1996).
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Qualification standards or selection criteria "that screen out or tend to screen
out an individual with a disability or a class of individuals with disabilities..."
is prohibited unless such criteria can be "shown to be job-related for the position
in question and [are] consistent with business necessity."64 Similarly, public
accommodations may not impose eligibility criteria:
that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or
any class of individuals with disabilities from fully and equally
enjoying any goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations, unless such criteria can be shown to be necessary for
the provision of the goods, services facilities, privileges, advantages,
or accommodations being offered.
The ADA takes an additional important step toward opening the doors for
individuals with disabilities. Recognizing that the exclusion of individuals
with disabilities sometimes results from the interplay between the physical or
mental impairments experienced by these individuals and the way the
environment has been constructed, the ADA builds upon law decided under
the Rehabilitation Act and requires that employers provide "reasonable
accommodations," and that public accommodations provide "reasonable
modifications." 66 Thus, employers and supervisors of public accommodations
must do more than cease applying criteria that have the intended or
unintended effect of excluding individuals with disabilities. They must also be
willing to rethink how they organize and structure their workplace or public
accommodation and make "reasonable" changes that will enable individuals
with disabilities to take full advantage of the job or public facility.67
Importantly, neither employers nor public accommodations need to alter their
structure radically.68 They need not accommodate every individual with a
disability. 69 The ADA recognizes that some individuals with a disability will
not be able to participate fully in some activities. But, if an individual with a
disability could participate fully if a modest, reasonable accommodation were
made, then the employer or public accommodation will be under an obligation

6442 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (1996).
6542 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i) (1996).
6642 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1996); 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (1996).
67

For a discussion of the concept of "reasonable accommodations," see Robert L.

Burgdorf, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of a
Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 460-63 (1991);
Orentlicher, supra note 62 at 65-71.
68
Sen. Rep. 101-485, supra note 61, at 64. For a fuller discussion of this point, see infra
Part V(B).
69

For a fuller discussion of this point, see infra notes 119-32 and accompanying text.
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to make it.70 This requirement, properly followed, will often obligate
employers or public accommodations to alter their smoking policies.

IV. ETS AND SMOKING: THE STATUTE

AND THE CASE LAW

The use of the ADA to challenge certain smoking policies is neither
exceptional nor in contradiction to the goals and policies underlying the ADA.
A rather simple application of the statute's plain language should result in a
determination that in some circumstances particular smoking policies
unlawfully discriminate against individuals with disabilities. That conclusion,
however, may strike many as a troubling extension of the concept of disability
rights, casting doubt upon the very breadth and vision of the ADA. Below, we
explain why that is not so.
We begin this section by discussing the ADA's definition of disability and
applying it to the plaintiffs who may bring ETS-related claims. Next we review
the application of the ADA to first, places of public accommodation and second,
workplaces. 71 In the section that follows, we consider the criticisms that the
application of the ADA to ETS may face, and we explain why such an
application may be feared by members of both the disability-rights movement
and entities who are required to comply with its mandates. We suggest that the
application of ETS to the ADA presents an invitation to reconsider the meaning
of the ADA and its wide-reaching but, ultimately, quite limited demand, for
reasonable accommodations."
V. POTENTIAL PLAINTIFFS: INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES

Although ETS causes wide-spread harm and many individuals may find it
offensive, not everyone may successfully challenge ETS policies under the
ADA. Only individuals who have a disability within the meaning of the Act
may claim its protections.
Under the Act, an individual has a disability if she or he has "(A) a physical
or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) [is] re-

70

E.g., Vande Zande v. State of Wis. Dept. of Admin., 44 F.3d 538 (7th Cir. 1995) (if
accommodations are both efficacious and proportional to costs, employer has duty to
accommodate paraplegic state employee); Howell v. Michelin Tire Corp., 860 F. Supp.
1488 (M. D. Ala. 1994) (it is reasonable to reassign disabled employee to vacant position
if employee is qualified); Mayberry v. Von Valtier, 843 F. Supp. 1160 (E.D. Mich. 1994)
(denying physician's motion for summary judgment based on a claim that there was no
Rehabilitation Act violation where physician could not afford the cost of an interpreter
necessary to treat patient); Perez v. Phil. Housing Auth., 677 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Pa 1987)
(person with severe lumbosacral sacroiliac sprain was a handicapped person under the
Rehabilitation Act).
71

We do not separately consider the applicability of Title II to ETS-related claims.
The analysis of Title II claims, however, should substantially parallel the analysis of the
Rehabilitation Act and Title I claims.
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garded as having such an impairment.' 72 In most instances, individuals
bringing ETS-related claims will be those who fall within subsection (A)-they
will claim that they have a "physical or mental impairment" that "substantially
73
limits" a "major life activity."
The regulations promulgated by the EEOC under Title 1,74 and the
Department of Justice under Title lII, 75 define a physical impairment broadly
to include "[any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement,
or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems:
neurological, musculoskelatal, special sense organs, respiratory (including
speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic
and lymphatic, skin and endocrine."76 Impairments to the respiratory or
cardiac systems thereby constitute "physical impairments." Accordingly, some
individuals who are at particular risk from exposure to ETS77 will be found to
have physical impairments within the meaning of the statute.
The more difficult requirement for most plaintiffs under the ADA has been
the need to establish that the physical impairment "substantially limits" a
"major life activity."78 The regulations state that in order for a major life activity
to be substantially limited, the individual must be "unable to perform a major
79
life activity that the average person in the general population can perform."
The courts have generally insisted that the limitation be "significant."80
Moreover, "short term" limitations do not qualify.8 l If an individual has his or
her breathing capacity substantially reduced due to an acute episode of
influenza, that individual would not be found to have a disability. However,
intermittent limitations may qualify.82 There is controversy over whether the
impact of medication should be considered when determining whether an
impairment substantially limits a major life activity. The EEOC takes the
position that the ameliorative effects of a medication should not be consid-

7242 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1996).
73
0ne can also imagine a case arising under subsection [c]. An individual could be
sufficiently effected by ETS so that others perceive her to be unable to engage in a major
life activity, even though she actually does not experience such a restriction.

7429 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(i) (1996).

7528 C.F.R. § 36.101 (1997).
7629 CFR § 1630.2(h)(1) (1997); 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(1)(i) (1997).
77See supra Part II.
7829 CFR § 1630.2(i)-(j) (1997); 28 C.F.R. § 36.104.
7929 CFR § 1630.2(j)(i) (1997).
80

Roth v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 57 F.3d 1446, 1454 (7th Cir. 1995).
EEOC Definition of the Term "Disability," EEOC Directives Transmittal, §§ 902.2(b)
1995 DLR. 51 d30(March 16, 1995)(hereinafter "EEOC").
81

82

1d. at § 920.4(d).
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ered. 83 Several federal courts have adopted this view.84 From this perspective,
an individual with severe asthma who would have trouble breathing were it
not for his or her medication may well be considered to have a disability even
though the individual's breathing is substantially aided by the medication.
Other federal courts ask whether the major life activity is significantly limited
even when medication is used. 85 Pursuant to this restrictive line of authority,
only individuals with illnesses that are not adequately controlled by
medication would be found to have a disability.
Individuals who wish to challenge smoking policies under the ADA may
argue that their physical impairment substantially limits two different types of
"major life" activities. First, and most clearly, they may point to activities in
which they experience substantial limitations even in the absence of second-hand
smoke. Most obviously, some litigants with significant respiratory impairments,
such as those caused by COPD or asthma, may claim that their ability to
breathe, or even to walk, is substantially and frequently limited by their
physical impairment.86 Because both breathing and walking are explicitly
listed in the Regulations as "major life activities," 8 7 individuals who suffer
substantial limitations in these activities should have the easiest time
convincing courts that they have disabilities within the meaning of the ADA.
For example, in Bell v. Elmhurst Chicago Stone,88 the court rejected the
defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's ADA claim because the defendant
did not contest that the plaintiff's asthma substantially limited his ability to
breathe. 89 In such cases, the individual would be claiming a disability
completely apart from exposure to ETS. 90
The more problematic case is presented by the individual who claims that
his or her ability to engage in a major life activity is substantially limited due
to ETS exposure. This may occur in one of two ways. First, a plaintiff may claim
that although he or she has a physical impairment that exists separately from
ETS (such as asthma), the major life activity that is substantially limited is
limited precisely due to the effects of the particular smoking policy at question.

83

1d. at § 920.5; Sen Rep. No. 101-485, sitpra note 61, at 52.

84

E.g., Harris v. H. & W. Contracting Co., 102 F.3d 516, 520 (11th Cir. 1996); Holihan
v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 87 F.3d 362, 366 (9th Cir. 1996).
85

E.g., Ellison v. Software Spectrum, 85 F.3d 187, 191 n.3 (5th Cir. 1996); Wilking v.
County of Ramsey, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17849, *15 (D. Minn. Nov. 6, 1997); Gaddy v.
Four B. Corp., 953 F. Supp. 331, 337 (D. Kan. 1997).
86
E.g., Heather K. v. City of Mallard, 887 F. Supp. 1249 (N.D. Iowa 1995)(accepting
that a child with respiratory and cardiac conditions that make it difficult for her to
breathe is entitled to a TRO against the city's outdoor burning policy under the ADA).
8729 CRF § 1630.2(i) (1997); 36 CFR 406.103 (1997).

88919 F. Supp. 308 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
89

d. at 309. Accord Geuss v. Difizer, 971 F. Supp. 164, 170 (E.D. Pa. 1996).

90Homeyer, 91 F.3d at 959.
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In other words, the individual may claim that she is substantially limited in her
ability to work precisely because her place of employment contains ETS.
Alternatively, an individual may claim that a sensitivity to ETS constitutes the
physical impairment that underlies the disability. In these cases, an individual
is effectively claiming that an allergy or sensitivity to ETS is the very physical
impairment upon which he or she is relying.
Courts have not been very sympathetic to either scenario. In a series of cases,
courts have found that plaintiffs who do not allege a substantial limitation of
any major life activity except the particular activity (usually a job) in question
92
are not disabled. 9 1 For example, in Forrisiv. Bowen, the Fourth Circuit held
that a utility systems repairer with acrophobia, who could not work on the
utility lines, was not disabled because the only limitation he experienced due
to his impairment was the inability to hold that precise job. Because Forrisi
could not show that his impairment would undermine his ability to hold other
jobs, he was not an individual with a disability. Citing that holding, the Second
be interpreted ...
Circuit has stated, the major life activity in question "cannot
' 93
to include working at the specific job of one's choice.
So too, individuals with asthma or other impairments who have only
claimed that their impairment limits their ability to work in one particular
workplace (and do not allege that they experience a substantial limitation of
another major like activity, such as walking or breathing) are unlikely to be
94
found to have a disability. For example, in Heilweil v. Mount Sinai Hospital the
plaintiff was an asthmatic who served as an administrator of a blood bank.
According to the complaint, the ventilation system at her place of employment
made her asthma much worse. The question before the court was whether she
had a handicap within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act. According to the
court, there was little doubt that the plaintiff had a physical impairment
because asthma "is a physiological disorder or condition that affects the
respiratory system."95 Plaintiff was unable to establish that her asthma
significantly limited a major life activity because it did not appear to inhibit her
ability to breathe or function generally outside of work. Nor could she show
that her asthma would cause her problems in any workplace other than the one

91The leading case claiming this proposition is Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 933
(4th Cir. 1986)(Rehabilitation case concerning acrophobia). See also Roth v. Lutheran
Gen. Hosp., 57 F.3d 1446 (7th Cir. 1995); Byrne v. Board of Educ., 979 F.2d 560 (7th Cir.
1991)(plaintiff with an allergy to a fungus at the workplace is not disabled).
92794 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1986).
93
Daley v, Koch, 892 F.2d 212, 215 (2d Cir. 1989)(Rehabilitation Act case) (citing
Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 739, 745 (C.D.Cal. 1984)). See also 29 C.F.R.
1630.2(3)(i) (1997) ("The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute
a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.").

9432 F.3d 718 (2d Cir. 1994).
95

d. at 723.
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at issue. 96 The court found that she was not protected by the Act because there
97
was no reason to believe that she could not find work elsewhere.
Importantly, the question of whether an individual's impairment affects his
or her ability to work generally or merely in the single workplace at issue is a
question of fact and should not be readily assumed by ajudge. Thus, in Homeyer
v. Stanley Tulchin Associates, Inc.,98 the district court had dismissed plaintiff's
ETS-related claim on the theory that her rhinitis and sinusitis would not
interfere with her ability to find employment in other workplaces. The Court
of Appeals reversed stating that the determination of whether an impairment
substantially limits the plaintiffs ability to work "is a factual determination, and
is therefore not the type of finding that is generally appropriately made on a
motion to dismiss. "99 The court added that the answer would depend upon
evidence of "the employment market, the plaintiff's job capabilities, as well as
the details of the nature and extent of the plaintiff's impairment.' 100
Closely related to cases such as Forrisi and Heilweil, which deal with
limitations upon working in a single workplace, are cases concerning
individuals whose very impairment is a sensitivity to ETS or other
environmental pollutants. In these cases, plaintiffs have claimed an allergy or
sensitivity to a particular pollutant at the workplace as their impairment.
Courts have found that such persons have not experienced a sufficiently
generalized limitation on a major life activity.101 In Gupton v. Commonwealth of
Virginia,102 for example, the plaintiff claimed that she had an allergy to tobacco
smoke that prevented her from working in the particular smoke-filled
workplace at issue. Relying on Forrisi,the court dismissed her claim because
she had "presented no evidence that her allergy foreclosed her generally from
obtaining jobs in her field."103

96

1d. at 723-24.

97

A similar analysis was applied in Rayha v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 940 F. Supp.
1066, 1067 (S.D. Tex. 1996); Mobley v. Board of Regents, 924 F. Supp. 1179, 1186 (S.D.
Ga. 1996).
9891 F.3d 959 (7th Cir. 1996).
99

1d. at 962.

00

1 Id. at 963.
101
Itis possible to imagine a case in which an individual was allergic to ETS or another
occupational pollutant, and became so ill as a result that she could not work without
accommodation anywhere. The cases litigated thus far, however, have not made such
a claim.
10214 F.3d 203 (4th Cir. 1994).
103

1d. at 205. See also Heilweil v. Mt. Sinai Hosp., 32 F.3d 718 (2d Cir. 1994) (plaintiff
was not disabled because poor ventilation at her workplace made her asthma
substantially worse); Karpel v. Inova Health Sys., 1997 WL 38137 (E.D. Va. 1997)
(sensitivity to smoke is not a disability); Huffman v. Ace Elec. Co., Inc., 1994 WL 583113
(D.C. Kan. 1994)(plaintiff who claimed sensitivity to unknown industrial irritants at one
particular job does not have a substantial limitation of the major life activity of working).
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These cases suggest that, in some instances, the very prevalence of workplace
smoking bans will make it difficult for plaintiffs to prevail. If most workplaces
in a plaintiffs' geographical area and line of work are smoke-free, and if the
plaintiff relies solely on the theory that she suffers a limitation of the major life
activity of working (as distinct from another life activity), the very fact that
more workplaces are limiting smoking will place plaintiffs in Gupton's
dilemma. This is not to say, however, that a plaintiff can never establish a
disability by relying upon an ETS-based limitation on the major life activity of
work. The possibility that sensitivity to ETS itself, or to other environmental
pollutants, can sometimes qualify as a disability under the ADA should not be
ignored. As the commentary to the EEOC regulations makes clear, "the
determination as to whether allergies to cigarette smoke, or allergies or
sensitivities characterized as environmental illness are disabilities covered by
the regulation [defining disability] must be made using the same case-by-case
104
This
analysis that is applied to other physical or mental impairments."
105
admonition was followed by the court in Whillock v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,
when it refused to grant defendant's motion based on the assertion that a
plaintiff with multiple chemical sensitivities could not be disabled as a matter
of law. Rather, the court stressed the issue of disability. The question of whether
such an impairment substantially affects a major life activity is ultimately a
question of fact. Nevertheless, those with acute sensitivity to ETS who can
show that that impairment actually limits their ability to engage in a major life
activity in more than a singular environment, should be entitled to the
protections of the ADA.
A. Title III Claims
Once it is determined that an individual has a disability within the meaning
of the ADA, the application of the statute to ETS-policies in public
06
accommodations is surprisingly simple. Staron v. McDonald's Corp.1 is
illustrative.
The plaintiffs in Staron were adults and children with systemic lupus and
asthma. They sued McDonald's and Burger King, claiming that the refusal of
the fast-food chains to prohibit smoking on the premises constituted a refusal
107
to provide them with "reasonable modifications" as required by the ADA.
The district court dismissed the complaint, finding that a smoking ban would
not be a "reasonable modification." 108 The plaintiffs appealed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

10428 C.F.R. Pt. 35, App. A.
105926 F. Supp. 1555 (N.D. Ga. 1995).
10651 F.3d 353 (2d Cir. 1995).
10742 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (1997).
10851 F.3d at 355.
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Writing for the court, which reversed the dismissal, Judge Walker noted that
neither the ADA nor the cases interpreting it "articulate a precise test for
determining whether a particular modification is 'reasonable.'- 109
Nevertheless, the court stated, "the determination of whether a particular
modification is 'reasonable' involves a fact-specific, case-by-case inquiry that
considers, among other factors, the effectiveness of the modification in light of
the nature of the disability in question and the cost to the organization that
would implement it."11o Under some circumstances, the court suggested, a
complete ban on smoking might not be necessary for the plaintiff's healthful
enjoyment of the accommodation's services. Thus, some individuals may not
be able to show that the amount of ETS to which they are exposed in a particular
public accommodation actually interferes with their ability to participate in or
patronize the establishment. This seems particularly likely to occur in
establishments, such as convenience stores or dry cleaners, where patrons
generally spend only brief periods of time. 111 Individuals with less severe
sensitivities may not be able to demonstrate that they require the elimination
of smoke in such venues. Other individuals with more severe sensitivities, may
require the complete absence of ETS to even enter an establishment.
Of course, as the Staron court realized, the question of whether a change in
smoking policy constitutes a "reasonable modification" depends also upon the
availability of alternative modifications. In some circumstances the segregation
of smoking to a particular building, floor, or even area that is separately
ventilated, might suffice to ensure that the plaintiff can use the facilities
equally.1 2 In other circumstances only the abolition of smoking in the facility
will enable the plaintiff to patronize it equally. Once again, resolution of such
issues is highly fact-dependent. It must be noted, however, that the segregation
of the individual with a disability (such as by creating one small no-smoking
area) will generally be an inappropriate response. As the very goal of the ADA
is the inclusion of individuals with disabilities, the statute prohibits a defendant
from providing an individual with a disability a benefit "that is different or
separate from that provided to other individual, unless such action is necessary
to provide the individual" with the service in question. 113 The Act further states

1091d.

110Id. at 356, citing D'Amico v. New York State Bd. of Law Examiners, 13 F. Supp. 217,
221-22 (W.D.N.Y. 1993).
111Employees, on the other hand, do spend a considerable amount of time in such
establishments. It may well be that while the elimination of ETS would not be a
reasonable modification necessary to afford equal services to patrons with a disability,
it would be a reasonable accommodation necessary to prevent discrimination against
an employee with a disability.
112
The separate ventilation must be real. The Surgeon General, for example, has
concluded that mere separation of smokers and non-smokers within an air-space does
not reduce the rates of ETS. See supra note 19.

11342 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(iii) (1997).
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that goods and service "shall be afforded to an individual with a disability in
the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of the individual. " 114 The
segregation of the individual with a disability will not suffice.
A final factor to be considered in determining whether a change in smoking
policy is "reasonable," is the financial burden it places on the public
accommodation. In Staron the court noted that some public accommodations
might find a smoking ban to be so financially burdensome as to be
unreasonable. 115 However, the court accepted the suggestion that because
McDonald's had voluntarily banned smoking in some of its facilities, a
fact-finder could conclude that a smoking ban was a modification that
116
McDonald's could undertake with "little or no cost."
The Staron court further noted that there was nothing in the ADA precluding
the possibility that a ban on smoking might constitute, in some circumstances,
a "reasonable modification" of a public accommodation. While section 501(b)
of the Act states that the ADA shall not be read to afford smokers with any right
or claim to smoke, it does not prevent individuals with disabilities from
requesting the elimination of smoking as a reasonable accommodation.117 To
the contrary, according to the court, Sec. 501(b) makes it clear that the Act may
indeed allow "the prohibition of, or the imposition of restrictions on, smoking
...in places of public accommodation..."118
However, Title III of the ADA permits a defendant to reject even a reasonable
modification if it would "fundamentally alter" the public accommodation. In
Emery v. Caravanof Dreams, Inc.,119 the court found that a smoking ban would
fundamentally alter a night club because the defendant's president testified
that "banning smoking would have a major economic impact and would result
120
in major national bands not choosing to perform at Caravan of Dreams."

11442 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(B) (1997).
11551 F.3d at 356.
1161d. at 358.

11742 U.S.C. § 12201(b) (1997).
11851 F.3d at 357 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12201(b).) (1997).
119879 F. Supp. 640 (N.D. Tex. 1995). The plaintiff relied primarily on the argument
that smoking in the night club constituted a "criterion" for admission which
discriminated against her in violation of Section 302(b)(2)(A)(i) of the ADA. The court
rejected that contention, noting that it stretched the meaning of the word "criterion" to
envision it as encompassing the presence of smoke. Instead, the court reasoned,
plaintiff's complaint should have been brought under Sec. 302(b)(2)(A)(ii), which
requires public accommodations to provide "reasonable modifications." Not having
structured thecase in that fashion, however, plaintiff did not present evidence rebutting
the defendant's contention that a smoking ban would constitute a "fundamental
alteration" of the facility within the meaning of 302(b)(2)(A)(ii).
120879 F. Supp. at 644.
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The plaintiff in that case, however, did not attempt to introduce any evidence
to the contrary) 21 Given the number of establishments that have either banned
or limited smoking successfully, 122 it seems unlikely that many establishments
other than bars or night clubs could follow the Caravan of Dreams in
persuading a court that a change in their smoking policy would constitute a
fundamental alteration. Thus, in most cases in which an individual with a
disability can show that a change in a public accommodation's smoking policy
would be necessary for that individual to participate in or enjoy the
accommodation's services, and the change in policy would not be unduly
costly or disruptive to the facility, a plain reading of Title III of the ADA should
result in a finding that the requested policy change constitutes a "reasonable
modification," required by the statute.
B. Title I Cases
Title I of the ADA prohibits discrimination in the workplace. It employs the
same definition of disability as is used in Title III, and in many ways, a case
under Title I parallels one brought under Title III. It is, however, worth noting
some distinctions between the two.
In order for a plaintiff to prevail on a claim under Title I, he or she must not
only have a disability, but must also be "qualified" for the job or position in
question. 123 The statute defines a "qualified individual with a disability" as one
who "with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential
124
functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires."
The inquiry is not whether the individual can perform the job as it currently
exists, but whether the individual can perform the "essential functions" of the
125
job if reasonable accommodations are provided.
Undoubtedly, some individuals who need a smoke-free work environment
might remain unqualified to work even if such accommodations were
provided. Thus, in Pletten v. Merit Systems Protection Board,126 the court found
that an asthmatic was not qualified to work because his asthma was so severe
that no reasonable accommodation could suffice to allow him to work. 127
121id.
122

Stanton A. Glantz & Lisa R.A. Smith, The Effect of OrdinancesRequiring Smoke-Free
Restaurants on RestaurantSales, 87 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1081 (1994).
12342 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1996). Title III does not make such a demand upon the
plaintiff.
12442 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1996).
125

For a discussion of this requirement see Burgdorf, supra note 67 at 457-58.
126908 F.2d 973 (6th Cir. 1990) (mem.) (Rehabilitation Act case); for full text of the
opinion see 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 11900 (July 13, 1990).
127

Plaintiff's work required him to travel throughout an army base. The court found
that the plaintiff was not qualified because the entire army base would have to be
smoke-free in order for the asthma to be under control. This case thus illustrates the
close inter-relationship between the question of whether an individual is "qualified" for
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Similarly, some individuals with severe respiratory or cardiac conditions
128
would not be able to work at particular jobs even in the absence of ETS.
If, however, an individual could perform the essential functions of the job
with a reasonable accommodation, then the individual is qualified for the
position within the meaning of the Act. According to the EEOC, reasonable
accommodations include: "Modifications or adjustments to the work
environment, or to the manner or circumstances under which the position held
or desired is customarily performed, that enable a qualified individual with a
disability to perform the essential functions of the job." 129 The EEOC
Regulations further provide that reasonable accommodations include "Making
existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by
individuals with disabilities."130 As in the case of Title III claims, the concept
of reasonable accommodation implicitly requires a finding that the
accommodation is in fact necessary to enable the employee to perform the job
successfully. If the presence of ETS actually posed no specific harm to an
individual with a disability (consider the case of a blind women who was
simply annoyed by ETS but had no physical impairment that placed her at
special risk for ETS), elimination of ETS would not be a 'reasonable
accommodation." Conversely, the elimination of ETS might easily be a
reasonable accommodation for an employee who requires oxygen and could
not safely work in the presence of smoking. The determination of what
constitutes a reasonable accommodation is highly fact-specific. The ultimate
conclusion depends significantly on both the needs of the plaintiff and the
circumstances of the defendant.
Even if an accommodation is reasonable, the employer still need not institute
it if it would "impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of
such covered entity."131 In determining whether an accommodation creates an
"undue hardship," courts are required to consider:
(i)the nature and cost of the accommodation needed ... ; (ii) the overall
financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in the provision

a position and whether an accommodation requested is "reasonable." See Burgdorf, supra
note 67 at 458. Accord Suttles v. United States Postal Serv., 927 F. Supp. 990, 1007 (S.D.
Tex. 1996).
128

See also Whillock v. Delta Air Lines, 926 F. Supp. 1555 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (plaintiff
with multiple chemical sensitivity is not qualified to work because she could not perform
the essential functions of her job even with reasonable accommodations). Thus, Title I
requires an individual to have an impairment severe enough to substantially limit a
major life activity but one that is not so severe as to prevent the individual from being
qualified for the job with the addition of reasonable accommodations. The result is
paradoxical: individuals with very mild respiratory or cardiac conditions will not be
found to be disabled while those with extremely severe conditions may be unqualified
to work.
12929 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1) (1997).
13029 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(i) (1997).
13142 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1997).
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of the reasonable accommodation; the number of persons employed
by such facility; the effect on expenses and resources, or the impact
otherwise of such accommodation upon the operation of the facility;
(iii) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall size
of the business of a covered entity with respect to the number of its
employees; the number, type and location of its facilities, and (iv) the
type of operation or operations of the covered entity, including the
composition, structure, and functions of the workforce of such entity,
the geographic separateness, administrative, or fiscal relationship
of
132
the facility or facilities in question to the covered entity.
This inquiry is exceptionally fact-specific. Different employers will be required
to make different types and different degrees of accommodation. Nevertheless,
given the fact that many employers have successfully banned or limited
smoking, 133 it is difficult to imagine many circumstances under which a
modification of smoking policies would be found to constitute an "undue
hardship".
C. Analysis of the Application of the ADA to ETS
Although the application of the ADA to ETS-related claims is
straightforward, it will no doubt prove to be controversial, as the
implementation of the ADA more generally has been. Since its enactment, the
ADA has been widely criticized on several accounts. 134 Two common criticisms
seem particularly applicable to ETS-related claims. The first suggests that the
ADA is helping the "wrong" persons: that those people who are "truly
disabled" are not being significantly helped, while others, without "real"
disabilities, are benefiting from the Act. 135 The second common criticism
contends that the ADA imposes excessive costs on both employers and
businesses. 136 These critiques, as they may be applied to ETS-cases, will be
discussed in turn.

13242 U.S.C. Sec. 12111(10)(B).
133While no formal comprehensive surveys of employer smoking restrictions have
been conducted, there appears to be a growing number of employers which have
instituted either company-wide or location specific smoking restrictions. IBM, Scott
Paper, Motorola, McDonalds, the U.S. Postal Service, and Walmart are among the many
thousands of employers who have restricted smoking in the workplace voluntarily. See
also U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, The 1992 Survey of Worksite Health
PromotionActivities, 83634 US Government Printing Office 342 (1992).
134
For a discussion of the criticism leveled at the ADA, see Pelka, supra note 17 at 36;
Development in the Law: Employment Discrimination, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1571, 1615-22
(1996).

135 Pelka, supra note 17, at 38. For an example of such criticism, see DisabilitiesAct is
HandicappedWhen it is too Broadly Applied, OMAHA WORLD HERALD, (Aug. 7, 1995) at 6.
136Another common criticism, applicable to all ADA cases, is that the ADA is flooding
the courts with litigation. In fact, in its first five years, the ADA resulted in only about
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D. Who are the Truly Disabled?
All ETS-related ADA claims challenge our notion of disability. Almost
always the plaintiffs who bring these claims lack readily apparent or traditional
disabilities. These persons are not blind, they do not use wheelchairs, nor are
they hearing impaired. Instead, they claim to live with conditions that are not
only invisible, but surprisingly common. 13 7 They have asthma, allergies, or
other respiratory or cardiac conditions shared by millions of Americans. The
physical impairments these individuals suffer do not readily separate them
from the rest of society. As a result, their assertions of disability make many
uncomfortable. Why do these people need "special protections?" Why do they
need them more than anyone else? If they receive protection, will that somehow
undermine society's willingness to provide civil rights protections to those
other people with disabilities, the ones with "true disabilities?"
The fear that the ADA is being misused by the "not-truly-disabled," was
clearly expressed in a recent ABC News story on the ADA. Introducing the
report, pointedly titled "Getting in on the Act," host Barbara Walters stated,
We begin with a story that may make you feel good, at least in the
beginning, because it concerns a law designed to help millions of
people, probably someone you know, but wait until you see how that
law is being outrageously abused. You will find it hard to believe. If
you're overweight, or oversexed, or drug-addicted, do you deserve
special treatment?... [E]very law benefits someone.
Unfortunately, it
138
isn't always the people who truly deserve it.
The report went on to claim that the ADA was not only confusing, but was
protecting alcoholics, drug-addicts, "lazy people, or incompetent people, or
men with odd sexual compulsions."'139 While ETS-related claims were not
mentioned in the story, they no doubt could have been: after all, they are
seldom brought by people with traditional disabilities. The individuals who
bring ETS-related claims can easily be caricatured as whiners who complain
excessively about an environmental pollutant that is annoying, even
dangerous, but not disabling, to many.
Such criticism of the ADA in general, and ETS-related claims in particular,
relies upon several premises that require further examination. First, the
criticism assumes that the ADA was meant to protect only some discrete groups
of individuals with "true disabilities." Implicitly that group is assumed to be
relatively small, significantly disabled, and easily distinguished from the

650 court cases, hardly a flood considering that this is a comprehensive nation-wide
statute. See Development in the Law, supra note 134, at 1617-18.
137

American Lung Association, Lung Disease Data 1994, American Lung Association,
1740 Broadway, New York, NY, at 6-8; American Heart Association, Heart and Stroke
Facts: 1995 Statistical Supplement, American Heart Association, Dallas, Tex, at 2.
138

ABC News 20/20 Transcript 1629 (July 19, 1996).
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nondisabled population. 140 Second, the attack suggests that the ADA is being
"abused" by claims of whiners and complainers, who "really aren't disabled,"
and don't really require or deserve civil rights protections. The criticism
assumes a clear dichotomy between the "truly disabled," and the "clearly
undeserving."
Reliance upon such a dichotomy violates not only the clear language of the
ADA and its legislative history, but also any thoughtful understanding of the
nature of disability. Indeed, one of the most profound and important premises
of the ADA, and also the prior Rehabilitation Act, as well as other
disability-rights statutes, 14 1 is the plasticity and malleability of the concept of
disability.
Under both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act there is no simple
all-inclusive list of specified categories of disability. The ADA's definition of
disability derives from a 1974 amendment to the Rehabilitation Act 142 which
was enacted precisely to broaden the definition of "handicap," the term then in
use, 14 3 to ensure that it was not understood narrowly as existing only in relation
to employment. 144 The Conference Report discussion of the 1974 Amendment
reveals that the term disability was not to be confined to a limited set of
conditions. The Report states:
Clause (A) in the new definition eliminates any reference to
employment and makes the definition applicable to the provision of
Federally-assisted services and programs. Clause (B) is intended to
make clearer that the coverage of sections 503 and 504 extends to
persons who have recovered-in whole or in part-from a handicapping
condition, such as a mental or neurological illness, a heart attack, or
cancer and to persons who were classified as handicapped (for
example, as mentally ill or mentally retarded) but who may be
discriminated against or otherwise be in need of the protection of
sections 503 or 504.

140

See, e.g., OMAHA WORLD HERALD, supra note 135, at 6 (arguing that the concept of
disability has been "absurdly distorted" and should be limited to "easily verifiable
disabilities like blindness and paralysis).
141 See, e.g., Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1491 (1995),
see also the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1995).
142

Pub. L. No. 93-516 (1974).

143 The ADA substituted the term "disability," for "handicap," in recognition of the fact
that "Many individuals with disabilities, and organizations representing such
individuals object to the use of such terms as 'handicapped person' or the 'handicapped.'
HR Rep. 101-485, House Committee on Education and Labor at U.S.C.C.A.N. 1990, vol.
4 at 333. The Rehabilitation Act was amended in 1992 to adopt the term "disability," in
lieu of "handicap." Pub L. 102-564, 106 Stat. 4344 (1993).
1441974 U.S.C.C.A.N at 6388-8389.
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Clause (C) in the new definition clarifies the intention to include
those persons who are discriminated against on the
145 basis of handicap,
whether or not they are in fact handicapped....
The Congressional report specifically noted that the term "handicap" could
be applied to conditions which did not significantly limit one's ability to work,
and that the term could include such nontraditional disabilities as cancer and
heart disease. From the very start of the federal effort to enforce the civil rights
of individuals with disabilities, Congress understood that the Rehabilitation
Act would be applied to individuals with invisible disabilities that are not
commonly thought of as disabilities.
Congress also understood that by enacting subsections (B) and (C) of the
definition, the law would apply even to those individuals who lack actual
impairments which significantly limit any major life activity as long as the
individuals have a record of such impairments or are wrongly perceived as
having such impairments. 146 The determination of whether an individual had
a handicap within the meaning of Section 504 could not be made simplistically.
Rather, in certain cases, the question of whether an individual had a disability
would depend upon the subjective understanding of the defendant. It is
evident that Congress never intended this legislation to protect only certain
groups of "deserving people," because the answer to the question "who was
deserving" depended upon the context.
The Rehabilitation Act's definition reflected a sophisticated understanding
that while physical and mental impairments could be judged abstractly, apart
from the social context in which they arise, disability itself could not be
abstractly ascertained. Rather, disability exists because of the interaction
between an individual's physical and/or mental state and the social context in
47
which the person operates.1
In an era before driving, night-blindness might not have been disabling.
Today, it may be. Similarly, in an era in which most labor is manual, mild
arthritis might be disabling. In the absence of social stigma, facial
disfigurements do not constitute disabilities. In the presence of stigma, the
disability they cause may be profound. 148 Thus, the conditions which
constitute disabilities cannot be specified or categorized because not only do
the biological causes of physical and mental impairments change (consider the

145 Id. at 6389.
14

61d.

47

1 See, e.g., Harlan Hahn, The Politics of Physical Differences: Disability and
Discriminationin PERSPECrVES ON DISABILITY 37 (Mark Nagler ed., 2d ed. 1993).
14 8

See Americans With Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearings Before the Committee on Labor
and Human Resources and the Subcommittee on the Handicapped, 101st Cong., 1st. Sess.,
S.933 (1989) (Statement of Rep. Coelho) (discussing discrimination due to a
disfigurement). But see Christian v. St. Anthony Med. Ctr., Inc., 117 F.3d 1051, 1053 (7th
Cir. 1997) (suggesting that a "revolting" disfigurement would not be a disability even if
the individual was discriminated because of it).
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demise of the polio virus and the rise of HIV), but the social conditions in which
people experience these impairments vary. The determination of disability,
therefore, must inevitability be made on a case-by-case basis because the
physiological and social conditions which people experience are usually
149
different.
In the years following the enactment of the 1974 amendments, the federal
courts reinforced this understanding of Section 504's definition of disability.
Although their interpretations were not wholly consistent, the courts
understood early on that Section 504 did not apply solely to a limited set of
conditions. Before the enactment of the ADA, the courts determined that, at
least under certain circumstances, individuals with conditions as varied as
angina, 150 asbestos-caused disease, 151 AIDS, 152 and tuberculosis 153 all had
disabilities within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act.
If there was any touchstone to the judicial determination of whether an
individual had a disability within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act, it was
the recognition that the Act did not create any finite set of disabilities. The
question, therefore, was not whether the plaintiff's particular condition fell
outside preordained parameters of the Act, but rather, whether his or her
physical or mental impairment substantially limited performance of any major
life activities, or whether the individual had a record of, or was perceived as
having, such an impairment.
The Supreme Court most fully considered the issue in the critical 1987 case
of School Board v. Arline.154 The question before that Court was whether the
Rehabilitation Act could be applied to protect a school teacher with
tuberculosis. While determining that a contagious disease could constitute a

149

This is not to say that in the particular context of late twentieth century America,
certain physiological or mental conditions will not almost always, if not always,
significantly impair an individual's major life activities so as to constitute a disability.
Thus, many courts have concluded that HIV disease is, at least for now, invariably a
disability. E.g. Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 554
(1997). But see Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Maryland, 123 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 1997)
(finding that asymptomatic HIV is not an impairment). Similarly, in our society, an
individual who requires a wheel-chair to be mobile will always be found to have a
disability. However, not all disabilities are as readily apparent. Even relatively minor
physiological conditions can cause a disability if in a particular culture they trigger
sufficient stigma and the "perception" of disability. Thus if a particular culture believed
that individuals with hay fever were contagious with a deadly disease, such individuals
should be disabled within the meaning of the ADA. See School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S.
273, 284-85 (1987) (discussing the fears and myths associated with contagiousness).
15OSee Cook v. United States, 688 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1982).
151

Fynes v. Weinberger, 677 F. Supp. 315 (E.D. Pa. 1985).

152

Chalk v. United States Dist. Court, 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988).

153

School Board v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987).

1541d.
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disability,155 the Supreme Court reasserted the breadth of Section 504's

definition of disability. The Court stated that the term must be given "a broad
definition, one not limited to so-called 'traditional handicaps." '156 The Court
added:
By amending the definition of "handicapped individual" to include not
only those who are actually physically impaired, but also those who
are regarded as impaired and who, as a result, are substantially limited
in a major life activity, Congress acknowledged that society's
accumulated myths and fears about disability and disease are as
handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from actual
impairment. Few aspects of a handicap give rise to the same level of
public fear and misapprehension as contagiousness. Even those who
suffer or have recovered from such noninfectious diseases as epilepsy
or cancer have faced discrimination based on the irrational fear that
they might be contagious. The Act is carefully structured to replace
such reflexive reactions to actual or perceived handicaps
with actions
15
based on reasoned and medically sound judgments. ?
Arline's understanding of what constitutes a handicap was quickly adopted
by the Congress. Shortly after the decision was rendered, the Rehabilitation Act
was amended to make it clear that a recipient of federal financial assistance, in
such circumstances, could discriminate only against an individual with "a
currently contagious disease or infection and who, by reason of such disease
or infection, would constitute a direct threat to the health or safety of other
individuals or who, by reason of the currently contagious disease or infection,
is unable to perform the duties of the job."'158 Thus Congress accepted Arline's
determination that individuals with nontraditional disabilities, more
specifically contagious diseases, could be considered to have a disability. At the
same time Congress amended the Act to ensure that employees need not be
retained on the job when they constitute a direct threat to the health or safety
of others.
In enacting the ADA, Congress chose to adopt the Rehabilitation Act's broad
definition of disability as it had come to be defined by the courts and
administrative agencies. 159 The legislative history of the Act makes crystal clear
that Congress assumed that Arline would be followed and that such
nontraditional disabilities as HIV-infection would be found to be disabilities

155 1d. at 281.
156 1d. at 280 n.5.
157 1d. at 284-85 (notes omitted).
158 Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 12 Stat. 31 (1988).
159 H.R. REP. No. 101-485 (II), Report of the Committee on Education and Labor, 101
St. Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 332.
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under the new Act. 160 The House Committee on the Judiciary further explained
that the Rehabilitation Act's definition was employed because "it would not be
possible to guarantee comprehensiveness by providing a list of specific
disabilities, especially because new disorders may develop in the future, as they
''
have since the definition was first established in 1973. 161
Congressional concern with the breadth of the ADA's definition of disability
and its applicability to numerous nontraditional disabilities led Congress, in
Title V of the Act, to specifically exclude certain conditions from coverage. Title
V specifies that the term disability shall not apply to "homosexuality,
transvestitism, transsexualism, pedophilia, 162 and a list of other specified
conditions which Congress excluded from civil rights protections. Thus, rather
than applying the Act to only a limited set of traditional disabilities, Congress
adopted a broad, flexible definition of disability which was then limited by the
' 163
specific exclusion of a few conditions that Congress found to be "unworthy."
This rejection of a limited set of categorical disabilities establishes that there
is nothing inappropriate or abusive in the claim that certain individuals with
respiratory or cardiac conditions have a disability within the meaning of the
Act. The fact that their disability may be invisible, and may not be of the sort
that most people picture when they hear the term "disability," does not mean
that the statute applies less to them than to anyone else. The question for
individuals with such invisible disabilities, as for all individuals who claim the
ADA's protection, is whether their physical or mental impairment significantly
limits a major life activity, or whether they have a record of impairment, or are
misperceived as having an impairment that would create a significant
limitation.
Demonstrating the affirmative answer to such questions is not at all easy.
While the ADA's definition of disability may be broad, it is not unbounded.
The statute limits its scope not by establishing any categorical set of disabilities,
but by requiring that individuals who seek its protection demonstrate that a
major life activity be "significantly" limited.
The courts have read this "significant limitation" requirement strenuously.
Critics who argue that the ADA is being readily abused by mere whiners or
complainers overlook the substantial body of decisional law interpreting the
"substantial limitation" requirement.

1601d.
161
H.R. REP. No. 101-485(111), Committee on the Judiciary, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 450.
16242 U.S.C. § 12211 (1997).
163
The political and moral decision to exclude certain unpopular conditions from
coverage is highly questionable. The point here, however, is simply to note that
Congress adopted a broad definition of disability that goes beyond traditional
disabilities tooften include cases of respiratory and cardiac conditions. Those conditions
that Congress did not want covered by the Act were explicitly excluded from coverage.
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The most important restriction on the substantial limitation requirement
derives from the Forrisicase discussed above.1 64 In rejecting the claim of the
utility system's repairer with acrophobia, the court noted that:
It would debase this high purpose [of the Rehabilitation Act] if the
statutory protections available to those truly handicapped could be
claimed by anyone whose disability was minor and whose relative
severity of impairment was widely shared. Indeed, the very concept
of an impairment implies a characteristic that is not commonplace and
that poses for the particular individual a more general
disadvantage
16 5
in his or her search for satisfactory employment.
The court further stated that an individual could not claim to be disabled under
the "regarded as having an impairment" prong of the definition merely because
the employer found the plaintiff incapable of doing a particular job. Rather,
"[tihe statutory reference to a substantial limitation indicates instead that an
employer regards an employee as handicapped in his or her ability to work by
finding the employee's impairment to foreclose generally the type of
employment involved."166
Forrisi'sreasoning has been widely followed by other courts, 167 the result
being that plaintiffs cannot easily prevail on a disability claim merely by
alleging an inability to work in a particular workplace. The impairment that
the plaintiff experiences, or is mistakenly believed to experience, must be far
more general in its impact. Only those individuals who experience a significant
limitation broadly are found to be protected by the ADA. For example, in the
ETS-context, an individual who claims that she cannot work in a particular
workplace because the ETS there bothers her will not likely be found to have
a disability. Only those plaintiffs who experience a significant impairment of a
major life activity outside of that workplace, such as those who generally have
difficulty breathing, or those who are so sensitive to ETS that they have
difficulty working or functioning in many environments, (or those who are
wrongfully perceived to have such difficulties), will be protected. While such
individuals may not have a traditional disability, the courts are, in effect,
requiring that their disability be as limiting and as pervasive in its impact as

164794 F.2d at 934. See also text accompanying notes 91-103, supra.
1651d. at 933.
166
67

1d at 934.

1 E.g., Byrne v. Board of Educ., 979 F.2d 560 (7th Cir. 1992)(allergy to fungus is not
a disability when an if the individual is limited in her ability to work in only one
workplace); Welsh v. Tulsa, 977 F.2d 1415 (10th Cir. 1992)(decreased sensation in two
fingers does not render a fire fighting applicant a handicapped person under the
Rehabilitation Act where the inability effected only one job); Maulding v. Sullivan, 961
F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1992)(chemical sensitivity is not a disability if it only limits the
plaintiff's ability to work in one particular workplace); Daley v. Koch, 892 F.2d 212 (2d
Cir. 1989)(police officer candidate not handicapped under Rehabilitation Act where
mental condition did not substantially impair a major life activity).
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are most traditional disabilities. As a consequence, the concept of disability is
neither degraded nor trivialized by recognizing such individuals as having a
disability.
The ability of individuals, with or without traditional disabilities, to prevail
in employment-related claims is further restricted by Title I's requirement that
the individual be "qualified" for the job in question. 168 While the Act states that
the determination of whether an individual is qualified is to be based on an
analysis of whether the individual can meet the "essential functions" of the job
'with or without reasonable accommodation, 169 the courts here too have made
clear that disability claims cannot be easily won. Everyone who wants a job but
cannot hold it cannot prevail. The courts have read the requirement that the
plaintiff be "qualified" for the position strictly, and with significant deference
to the employer.
Similarly, although Title III of the ADA does not explicitly contain a
"qualification requirement," it does state that a modification requested need not
be provided if it would "fundamentally alter" the service in question.170 In
many ways, this limitation on the requirement to provide reasonable
modifications parallels Title I's "qualification" requirement and serves to limit
the degree to which the ADA requires defendants to alter their programs or
17 1
establishments to meet the needs of persons with disabilities.
Strict judicial interpretation of the "qualification" requirement, as well as the
fundamental alteration defense, stems back to the Supreme Court's initial foray
into disability-rights jurisprudence in Southeastern Community College v.
Davis.172 That Rehabilitation Act case concerned a nursing student with a
significant hearing impairment who sought admission into a clinical training
program. In rejecting her claim, the Supreme Court stated that "legitimate
physical qualifications may be essential to participating in particular
programs."'173 The Court added further that "[a]n otherwise qualified person is
one who is able to meet all of a program's requirements in spite of his
handicap."174

16842 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1997).
16942 U.S.C. § 12112(B) (1997).
17042 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (1997).
171
There is a major difference between the qualification requirement of Title I and the
fundamental alteration provision of Title III. Structurally, the qualification requirement
appears as part of a plaintiff's prima facie case. In Title Il, however, a plaintiff need not
prove that he or she is qualified. Rather, it appears that the defendant must prove that
an otherwise reasonable modification is not required because it would create a
fundamental alteration of the public accommodation in question. See Wendy E. Parmet,
Title III: Reimagining the Public World, in THE AMERIcANs WITH DISABILITIES AcT 123,
127-28 (Lawrence Gostin & Henry Beyer eds., 1991).
172442 U.S. 397 (1979).

1731d. at 407.
174

Id. at 406.
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Subsequent case law, 175 and the explicit language of the ADA, modified
Davis to make clear that an individual would be qualified for a position if he
or she could meet all the essential requirements of the job with reasonable
accommodations. Nevertheless, courts have remained deferential to
employers. As one federal court noted "Courts are prohibited from requiring a
fundamental alteration in a defendant's program to accommodate a
176
handicapped individual."
The requirement that plaintiffs meet the essential functions of the job has
proven particularly troubling to plaintiffs whose disability or chronic illness
causes substantial absenteeism. 177 This may often be the case for individuals
with respiratory or cardiac disabilities. For example, in Tyndall v. National
Education Centers,178 the plaintiff was an instructor with lupus erythematosus,
who missed several days of work due to her illness. In finding for the employer,
the court stated, "a regular and reliable level of attendance is a necessary
element of most jobs. An employee who cannot meet the attendance
requirements of the job at issue cannot be considered a 'qualified' individual
179
protected by the ADA.'
As a result of such reasoning, many of the individuals who have chronic
illnesses severe enough in their impact to constitute disabilities will also find
that they are not "qualified" for work within the meaning of the ADA.
Individuals with lung cancer, cystic fibrosis, or COPD may well find that
although their impairment limits their major life activities substantially enough
to establish them as having a disability, it also results in absenteeism or other
limitations in their ability to perform essential functions of the job.
In short, contrary to the claims of critics, it is difficult for an individual
without a traditional disability to prevail on a frivolous ADA suit. Rather, the
Scylla and Charybdis of "disability" and "qualification," ensure that the statute
protects only a relatively small class of individuals: 180 those with impairments
significant enough to limit generally and substantially their major life activities

175

See School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273,287 n. 17(1987); Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S.
287 (1985).
176
pandazides v. Virginia Bd. of Educ., 804 F. Supp. 794 (E.D. Va. 1992)(Rehabilitation
Act case brought by a teacher).
177
See Audrey E. Smith, The Presence Is an Essential FunctionMyth: The ADA'S Trapdoor
for the Chronically 111,
19 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 163 (1995).
17831 F.3d 209 (4th Cir. 1994).
179

1d. at 213 (citations omitted). See also Carr v. Reno, 23 F.3d 525 (D.C. Cir.
1994)(employee with absenteeism due to ear disability was not qualified).
180
0f course, others can bring a lawsuit. The possibility that an individual who is not
protected by a statute can sue under that statute hardly constitutes a valid criticism of
the statute. Individuals can falsely bring contract, tort, or constitutional claims. We
would hardly say that such a possibility constitutes a valid justification for limiting those
legal theories.
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without compromising their ability, with reasonable modifications, to perform
181
the essential functions of a job.
As a result of these requirements and rigorous judicial scrutiny, the vast
majority of individuals who are bothered or annoyed by ETS have no realistic
prospect of prevailing on such a claim. Instead, an individual needs to have a
substantial limitation of a major life activity, but one that is neither so severe as
to render the individual unqualified to work or so profound as to require a
fundamental alteration of the public accommodation in question. Individuals
with minor sensitivities to ETS will not be disabled. Individuals who have
respiratory or cardiac problems so severe that they cannot work or participate
in public life even with reasonable accommodations will not be entitled to
relief. Only those whose condition falls somewhere in the middle of a
continuum of severity will prevail. Allowing their claims can hardly open any
floodgate or undermine the concept of disability. Instead, it recognizes that
disabilities come in a variety of forms. Only those individuals who have a
significant enough impairment to limit generally their major life activities but,
with simple changes in the status quo, can indeed meet the requirements of a
job or participate in a program, should be accommodated and be given the
chance to lead whole and independent lives. To see fully why that is so, one
other issue needs first to be explored: the concept of reasonable
accommodation.
VI. THE COST OF ACCOMMODATION
Many critics of the ADA argue that the law imposes excessive and onerous
costs on employers and businesses. 182 Of particular concern to the critics is the
Act's broad requirement that employers provide "reasonable
accommodations," and businesses "reasonable modifications" to permit
inclusion of individuals with disabilities.1 83 According to ADA critic Brian
Doherty, "ADAdemands from America's businesses and local governments are
heroic and often fabulously expensive efforts to achieve social goals that could
be well approximated in other ways, and whose costs, mandated by
government, ought not weigh entirely on individuals." 184 Defendants in
ETS-related cases have echoed those concerns. In the trial in Emery v. Caravan
of Dreams, Inc., for example, the defendant's president testified that a ban on

181

No qualification requirement is actually a predicate for filing suit against a public
accommodation.
182

See 109 HARV. L. REV. 1602, 1618-19 (1996) and sources cited therein at note 3; Brian
Doherty, Disabilities Act: Source of Unreasonable Accommodations, THE SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIBUNE July 16, 1995, at G-1 ("ADA demands from America's businesses and
local governments are heroic and often fabulously expensive efforts to achieve social
goals that could be well approximated in other ways...").
183

E.g., Remarks of Rep. Maiselle Dolan Shortley, Debate, House Proceedings and

Debates of P.L. 101-3336, May 15, 1990.

184 Doherty, supra, note 182, at G-1.
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smoking would result in some bands refusing to appear at the night club, with
the result being a significant disruption of business.185
In reality, however, studies have shown that most accommodations required
by the ADA are not particularly costly. Peter Blanck's study of the
implementation of the ADA at Sears, Roebuck and Co., for example, concluded
that between January 1, 1993 and December 31, 1995, the average cost of a
workplace accommodation was only $45.186 Moreover, many accommodations
proved to increase the productivity of all employees, not only those with
disabilities. 187 Given the generally harmful effect of ETS on the health and
productivity of all workers, 188 it would appear especially likely that
modifications of smoking policy would actually lead to economic benefits for
many businesses. 189 The fact that numerous businesses have chosen on their
own accord to prohibit or limit smoking suggests that the costs of modifying
smoking policies are not at all onerous for most enterprises.1 90
More importantly, the "excessive cost" argument, in the ETS-context, as
elsewhere, overlooks both the explicit language of the statute and regulations,
plus the judicial opinions that have interpreted them. Importantly, the ADA
does not require all modifications or accommodations that an individual with
a disability would need in order to participate in a workplace or public
accommodation. The statute only mandates those alterations that are
"reasonable." Further, an employer need not provide even a reasonable
accommodation if it would create an "undue hardship." 191 Nor is an employer
required to modify the "essential functions" of the job. 192 Similarly, a public
accommodation need not provide a reasonable modification if it would result
in a "fundamental alteration" of the operation. 193

185879 F. Supp. 640, 644 (N.D. Tex. 1995).
186

Peter David Blanck, Communicating the Americans with DisabilitiesAct: Transcending
Compliance: 1996 Follow-up Report on Sears, Roebuck, and Co., 1996, The Annenberg
Washington Program, 1996, at 18.
187Id.
18859 Fed. Reg. 15968, 16010 (1994) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. Pts. 1910, 1915, 1926,
and 1928) (proposed September 16, 1994).
189
See, e.g., David H. Mudarri, The Costs and Benefits of Smoking Restrictions: An
Assessment of the Smoke-Free Environment Act of 1993 (H.R. 3434), Washington, DC, Indoor
Air Provision, Office of Air and Radiation, Environmental Protection Agency (1994).

190Staron, 51 F.3d at 358.
19142 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1997).
19242 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1997); See, e.g., Larkins v. CIBA Vision Corp., 858 F. Supp 1572,
1583 (N.D. Ga. 1994) (employer need not eliminate essential functions of the job; here
the requirement that a customer service representative answer telephone calls); Bolton
v. Scrivner, Inc., 836 F. Supp. 783, 788 n. 4 (W.D. Okla. 1993), affd, 36 F.3d 939 (10th Cir.
1994)(employer need not modify actual duties of the job).
19342 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (1997).
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In applying these terms, the courts have generally been extremely sensitive
to defendants' concerns not only about clearly documented costs but also about
more general disruptions to the employer's right to run the workplace as he or
she sees fit. 194 Many courts, for example, have rejected claims for job
reassignment or transfer, finding that they would impose too much disruption
on an employer. For example, in Carterv. Tisch,195 the plaintiff was an asthmatic
custodian who experienced asthma attacks due to his occupational exposure
to dust. In order to avoid the dust, he requested reassignment to a permanent
light duty position. Rejecting his contention that reassignment constituted a
"reasonable accommodation," the court noted that "[tihe case law is clear that,
if a handicapped employee cannot do his job, he can be fired, and the employer
is not required to assign him to alternative employment. '196 In effect, the court
deferred to the employer's underlying discretion to make work assignment
decisions. Only the most modest intrusions on that right would have been
sanctioned by the court.
Courts have also been very deferential to employer concerns about health
or safety risks. In Huberv.Howard County 197 the plaintiff was a recruit firefighter
with asthma. He requested, as an accommodation, the ability to use his inhaler
during exercises. The court rejected the claim because of the defendant's
contention that the inhaler constituted a safety hazard if placed near open
flames or exposed to high temperatures. This contention was accepted with a
relative paucity of evidence. The court was simply willing to defer to the
employer's presumed superior knowledge and implicit right to determine
workplace conditions. Similar deference is also evident in the many court cases
that have upheld the right of a health care institution to dismiss or reassign a
health care worker who is HIV-positive. 198 Despite the extremely low risk
posed by such workers, cited by one court as between 1/200,000, to 1 in 2
million, 199 the courts have generally given considerable deference to the
knowledge of the institution.
Judicial reluctance to impose any but the most modest of "reasonable
accommodations" becomes especially apparent when reviewing ETS claims.
For most employers or businesses, the prohibition of smoking or its limitation

194

Some critics have charged that the undue burden standard is so favorable to
employers as to render the ADA ineffective. See Drimmer, supra note 16.
195822 F.2d 465 (4th Cir. 1987).
196
1d. at 467. See also Magel v. Federal Reserve Bank, 776 F. Supp. 200 (E.D. Pa.
1991 )(employer not required to create new job that would allow asthmatic employee to
work 8 months a year and not during the winter).

197849 F. Supp. 407 (D.Md. 1994).
198

See, e.g., Doe v. University of Md. Med. Sys., 50 F.3d 1261 (4th Cir. 1995); Bradley
v. University of Tex., 3 F.3d 922 (5th Cir. 1993) and Scoles v. Mercy Hosp., 887 F. Supp.
765 (D.C. Pa. 1994).
199

Scoles v. Mercy Hosp., 887 F. Supp. 765 (D.C. Pa. 1994).
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to isolated, well-ventilated areas would impose little or no cost.200 However,
when plaintiffs have required or requested more far-reaching modifications
pertaining to smoking policies, they have often met judicial rejection. Harmer
v. Virginia Electric& Power Co., 201 is illustrative. The plaintiff there suffered from
a pulmonary disability. In response to several requests by Harmer to prohibit
smoking, his employer, Virginia Power, announced that smoking would be
banned in all its facilities, except in specially constructed smoking rooms.
Virginia Power asserted that this policy was designed to maintain employee
morale, and prevent the potential loss of productivity from employees who
smoke. Harmer, nevertheless, continued to press for a total ban on smoking. In
rejecting his contention that a total prohibition constituted a reasonable
accommodation, the court stated that, "Harmer is not entitled to absolute
accommodation under the ADA because he can perform the essential functions
of his position with the reasonable accommodations made by Virginia Power.
"202 Because
..
Harmer could not show that he required the total elimination
of smoke from the building, his request was not reasonable. Interestingly, the
court made this ruling without making any finding that a total prohibition
would actually impose substantial or indeed any actual costs on Virginia
203
Power.
Vickers v. Veterans Administration204 was a similar case. In that case the
Veterans Administration attempted to accommodate the plaintiff's disability
by removing smoking from his office space and increasing the room's
ventilation. The plaintiff, however, requested that smoking be totally
eliminated from the "Supply Service" in which he worked. The court rejected
that request as going too far, finding that his employer had already provided

200While costs can be as small as those necessary for placing adequate signage
throughout the worksite, employers may want to ease the transition to a smoke-free
workplace by making smoking cessation programs available to employees, providing
educational information about the benefits of and need for a smoke-free workplace, or
even hiring a policy consultant. See Dana Farber Cancer Institute, "Guide to Workplace
Tobacco Control," Massachusetts Tobacco Control Program, Massachusetts Department
of Public Health, Boston, Mass. (1993). OSHA has estimated that the cost to make
virtually all workplaces in the country smoke-free would vary between $0 and $68
million for the first year depending on whether separately ventilated designated
smoking areas are to be provided to smokers. See 59 FED. REG. 15968, 16013 (1994) (to
be codified at 29 C.F.R. Pts. 1910, 1915, 1926, and 1928) (proposed September 16, 1994).
201831 F. Supp. 1300 (E.D. Va. 1993).
202

1d. at 1306.

203

1t should be noted, however, that this was a Rehabilitation Act case. The
Rehabilitation Act does not explicitly state that an employer can defend a claim for
reasonable accommodations by showing that the requested accommodation would
create an undue hardship. That language is exclusive to the ADA. In the context of the
Rehabilitation Act, the court must engage in a more generalized inquiry as to whether
a requested accommodation is "reasonable."
204549 F. Supp. 85 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
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him with sufficient reasonable accommodations. 205 As in Harmer, the court
presupposed that an employer has an implicit right to put in place whatever
policies it chooses to implement except when modifications are absolutely
necessary to permit an employee with a disability to continue working. Thus,
even if an accommodation will not cost the employer anything but its "right to
decide," the courts will not require that the accommodation be made unless the
plaintiff can show that it is necessary.
Not surprisingly, when employers can actually present testimony showing
that a change in smoking policy will cause economic pain, courts have been
20 6
receptive to the defendants' concerns. Thus, in Emery v. Caravan of Dreams,
noted above, the court found for the defendant based on the undisputed
testimony that the prohibition of smoking in the night club would reduce the
willingness of some bands to perform there. 207 Of course, in many instances
courts will be unable to find that a change in smoking policy will have
economically deleterious effects. As the court noted in Staron,208 the fact that a
business has previously chosen to prohibit smoking, and has done so
successfully, undermines the assumption that a smoking ban will have adverse
economic consequences for many businesses. But in those instances in which
significant economic consequences can be demonstrated, or when a plaintiff
cannot demonstrate to the court's satisfaction that a requested accommodation
is actually necessary, a court is likely to defer to the defendant.
In short, the ADA imposes neither the heroic nor the onerous burdens that
its critics decry. 209 Rather, as the ETS cases suggest, the ADA requires only that
employers and public accommodations make relatively modest
accommodations, where they can be shown to be actually necessary to permit
an individual with a disability to work or participate in civic life.
VII. CONCLUSION
ETS-related ADA cases provide a prism for thinking about the ADA and the
rights of individuals with disabilities. On the one hand, the ETS cases
demonstrate the unusual breadth of the statute. The ADA applies not only to
a few people with a few limited disabilities, but to a far broader class, in an
infinite set of situations.
On the other hand, the ETS cases demonstrate why the breadth of the ADA
need not be feared. While the ADA employs a broad, open-ended definition of
205

See also Gupton v. Commonwealth, 14 F.3d, 203 (4th Cir. 1994); Pletten v. MSPB,

908 F.2d 973 (6th Cir. 1990)(mem.). Pletten is more fully discussed supra notes 126-27 and

accompanying text.
206879 F. Supp. 640 (N.D. Tex. 1995).
207

1d. at 644.

20851 F.3d 353 (2d Cir. 1995).
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This is not to say that employers or businesses need not bear any costs. Some
accommodations will create costs for defendants. The point here only is that the costs
are often less than claimed, and often as in the case of ETS, non-existent.
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disability, its demands upon plaintiffs are high. Only those who experience, or
have a record of impairment, or are misperceived as having impairments that
interfere generally with their major life activities are protected. Those
individuals whose impairments are so significant that they cannot, even with
reasonable modifications, perform the essential functions of a job, or
participate in a public accommodation without its fundamental alteration, will
not be entitled to relief. Moreover, when individuals with disabilities have
asked for burdensome modifications to accommodate their vulnerability to
ETS, the courts have usually rejected their pleas. Indeed, what a review of the
ETS cases demonstrate is the extraordinary modesty (and low cost) of most
accommodations necessary to enable individuals with ETS-related disabilities
to work or participate in public accommodations. Only when the court has
been fully satisfied that the modification is reasonable and would not add
significant (never mind undue) costs upon a defendant, has a plaintiff been
allowed to proceed.
Critics of the ADA nevertheless mock its breadth and fear its impact. They
suggest that if the concept of disability is not confined to a few discrete
conditions, and reasonable modifications are not limited to a few narrow
accommodations, the burdens on the economy will be vast. The ETS-cases
teach a very different lesson.
There is no reason to unnaturally confine the concept of disability. Disability,
as a legal concept, is but an endpoint in a continuum of vulnerabilities resulting
from the relationship between our physiological beings and the environment
in which we live. Although the law relies upon a stark division between those
with disabilities and those without (only those with statutory disabilities have
their rights fully protected by the statute),210 the reality is more complex. All
individuals will face different limitations on their major life activities at
211
different points in their lives.

Some aspects of our socially constructed environment interfere with the lives
of only a few individuals with uncommon conditions. Other aspects of our
environment interfere with the ability of many individuals to go about their
life activities in a healthful and productive manner. ETS falls within the latter
category All individuals are harmed by ETS, 212 some more than others.

Rather than fearing this continuum, and artificially constricting the
application of the ADA, the ETS-cases provide the rationale for adopting the

210
The ADA also protects individuals who are discriminated against because they are
associated with someone with a disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4)(1997); 42 U.S.C.

§ 12182(b)(1)(E)(1997).
2111t may be the fear of this very fact, that all mortal beings are biologically vulnerable,
that creates the "existential anxiety" which underlies the desire to isolate, stigmatize,
and discriminate against individuals with disabilities. Hahn, supra note 147, at 41. Thus,
insecurity about one's own disabilities may explain the desire to limit the concept of
disability to a few discrete categories, thereby insisting upon a stark, but unrealistic,
separation between people with disabilities and the rest of the population.
212

See supra Part II.

1997-981

ENVIRONMENTAL TOBACCO SMOKE

opposite approach. When an individual with a vulnerability to ETS severe
enough to require an accommodation prevails in obtaining a modification of
an entity's smoking policy, all the other individuals who use the workspace or
public accommodation are benefited. It is precisely because disability (as a
human condition rather than a legal category) exists in a continuum that the
benefits obtained by ADA-required reasonable modifications often extend to
many more than those who would qualify as plaintiffs in a lawsuit.21 3 Precisely
because there can be no stark boundary between a successful ETS plaintiff and
the rest of the world, the victories they win bring far wider benefits than are
generally recognized.
It is important to recall that the wide scope of the ADA is tempered by the
limitations of its demands. The ADA does not require that all changes that are
necessary to enable an individual with a disability work or participate in public
life be carried out. An employer need not employ a worker with COPD who is
absent 50% of the time, or even 20% of the time. All the ADA asks is that if with
small changes, that worker can do the job productively, she be given the
opportunity to do so. If banning smoking from the interior of her workplace
constitutes the difference between her productivity and her inability to work
and be independent, then surely the scale tips in favor of segregating the ETS.
The simplicity of the demand suggests that it is one that should not be feared
by anyone.
In short, the ADA-ETS cases demonstrate both why there can be no finite set
of disabilities, or modifications, and why there should not be. If the ultimate
goal of the ADA, or more broadly our disability rights law, is the inclusion and
independence of individuals with disabilities, then we must be willing to assess
continuously how the social world interacts with the needs and impairments
of different individuals. In doing so, the demands are not and cannot be heroic.
We do not live in Utopia and our laws cannot mandate such conditions. Our
laws cannot repeal the realities of the market. Businesses cannot assume all
costs and stay in business. The social environment cannot be completely
changed to ensure that all individuals will be able to participate in all public
activities or succeed at all jobs. 214 But in many cases, as is often true with ETS,

213
A similar point could be made about many other modifications and alterations of
policies that have occurred as a result of an awareness of the needs of individuals with
disabilities. For example, ramps and curb cuts have been added to benefit individuals
with disabilities. Such modifications benefit far more people, from parents pushing
strollers to individuals suffering from temporary physical impairments (such as
sprained ankles). These impairments may not qualify as a legal disability, and yet surely
constitute a physical impairment that affects the ability to engage in major life activities.
Similarly, a law school may well find that academic support services, put in place to
accommodate students with learning disabilities, benefit many more students than
those who can be diagnostically determined to have a learning disability.
214
For a discussion of the fact that full inclusion of some individuals with disabilities
may indeed be costly and may raise issues of distributive justice, See David Wasserman,

Disability, Discriminationand Fairness, 13 REP. FROM THE INST. FOR PHIL. & PUB. POL'Y. 7

(Winter 1993).
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relatively simple and surprisingly inexpensive modifications can make a world
of difference. Far from violating the "core intent" of the ADA, recognizing cases,
such as those involving ETS, helps to fulfill the Act's central goal: the inclusion
and independence of those who might otherwise be excluded.

